Saba Sands court action did not violate timeliness rule, attorneys contend
Two days before the attorneys for a Siesta Key property owner filed a response to a Sarasota County motion that seeks dismissal of litigation against the county over the use of beachfront property, the judge who had been assigned to the case issued an order of recusal, The Sarasota News Leader has learned.
Initially, Ashley E. Gaillard of the Bentley Goodrich Kison firm in Sarasota was representing William Saba, principal of Saba Sands II LLC, in a Petition for Writ of Certiorari against the county. Then, on Oct. 6, Morgan Bentley, one of the founding partners of the firm, filed a formal notice with the 12th Judicial Circuit Court regarding his appearance on behalf of Saba Sands.
A day later — Oct. 7 — Circuit Judge Stephen Walker issued his Order of Recusal, explaining that his action was necessary because of his “personal and professional relationship” with Bentley.
Walker cited Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(k).
On Oct. 10, 12th Circuit Chief Judge Diana L. Moreland reassigned the case to Circuit Judge Hunter Carroll, the News Leader read in the case docket.
Regular readers may recall that, in August 2023, Carroll ruled in favor of Siesta Key resident Lourdes Ramirez in a case in which she contended that the County Commission had violated the county’s Comprehensive Plan in approving a new land-use regulation that would have permitted the construction of high-rise hotels on the barrier island.
As of late afternoon on Oct. 29, no other filings appeared in the Saba Sands docket subsequent to Moreland’s order.
Saba Sands had been pursuing mediation with the county through a state process called the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act(FLUEDRA), which is authorized by Section 70.51 of the state statutes. The principal of the limited liability company — Sarasota attorney William Saba — was seeking to overturn the County Commission’s November 2024 denial of a Coastal Setback Variance he needed to construct a three-story, two-unit condominium complex that would have been located 229.3 feet seaward of the Gulf Beach Setback Line (GBSL). That line, established in the County Code in 1979, was created to protect natural habitat and dunes on the county’s shoreline which, in turn, protect landward properties from storm surge and other flooding events.
On Sept. 17, attorney Gaillard with Bentley Goodrich Kison filed the court petition on behalf of Saba Sands, whose goal is — as the petition makes clear — “to quash and remand the decision” of the County Commission last year.
Then, as the News Leader has reported, on Sept. 19, Deputy County Attorney David Pearce filed a motion that sought dismissal of the case.
Judge Walker gave Saba Sands 15 days to file a response, including comments on a DeSoto County case that Walker made clear had a bearing on the Saba Sands litigation.
Pearce has contended that the Saba Sands court petition was not filed in a timely manner, in accord with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
In their response, attorneys Bentley and Gaillard contest that. They cite five reasons for their assertion.
First, they write, “the County’s allegation that Saba Sands ‘abandoned’ the FLUEDRA proceeding after August 18, 2025, is not evidenced anywhere in the appellate record and therefore may not be considered in this matter.”
“Second,” they point out, “no evidence exists anyway to support this assertion because neither the County nor the Special Magistrate ever issued a written notice or took any action to terminate the FLUEDRA proceeding.”
An attorney who serves as a Special Magistrate in a FLUEDRA proceeding works with the parties in an effort to help them reach a settlement of their dispute.
“Third,” Bentley and Gaillard write, with emphasis, “even if the Court could consider a factual allegation not contained in the record, and even if Saba Sands had in fact ‘abandoned’ the FLUEDRA proceeding after August 18, 2025, the County’s assertion that as a result Saba Sands would no longer be entitled to any statutory tolling is inconsistent with both the text and the object and purpose of the statute itself.”
“Tolling,” Wikipedia explains, “is a legal doctrine that allows for the pausing or delaying of the running of the period of time set forth by a statute of limitations, such that a lawsuit may potentially be filed even after the statute of limitations has run.”
Fourth, Bentley and Gaillard contend — again, with emphasis — the county erroneously interpreted the FLUEDRA statute in arguing to the Circuit Court that the law allowed only a total of 30 days, counting “both the days between [the County Commission’s formal approval of the resolution denying the Coastal Setback Variance to Saba Sands and Saba Sands’] filing of its FLUEDRA petition and the days between the end of the FLUEDRA proceeding and the filing of the appeal …”
“Fifth,” Bentley and Gaillard continue, “even if the Court adopts the County’s interpretation, in conflict with the holding of another court in this same Circuit just last year, Saba Sands’ [petition] is still timely because the County already had notice of the initiation of the FLUEDRA proceeding on the day the Resolution was filed, meaning that zero days elapsed between the [vote on the] Resolution and the [filing of the] FLUEDRA petition.”
The portion of that statement regarding the “holding of another Court” in the 12thJudicial Circuit refers to a DeSoto County case that Judge Walker had ordered the Saba Sands legal team to address.
The timeline, as Bentley and Gaillard see it
In their response, Bentley and Gaillard write that Saba Sands sent the county a petition on Dec. 17, 2024, to initiate the FLUEDRA process. That followed the County Commission’s Nov. 19 vote to deny the limited liability company the Coastal Setback Variance, they add.
Then, they point out, on Jan. 15, the commissioners formally adopted the resolution of denial.
“Saba Sands promptly sent the County an updated FLUEDRA petition incorporating the Resolution on January 22, 2025,” Bentley and Gaillard continue.
Next, they write, “The FLUEDRA proceeding with the Special Magistrate commenced on June 17, 2025, then resumed on August 18, 2025. No resolution was reached.”
The Special Magistrate who was handling the proceeding “did not issue any written recommendations,” Bentley and Gaillard point out, “nor did the County act on any recommendations.” Moreover, they note, neither the Special Magistrate nor the county provided any written notice that the FLUEDRA proceeding was terminated.
Saba Sands then filed its petition with the court on Sept. 17, they write.
Bentley and Gaillard cite Section 70.51(10)(a) of the Florida Statutes in stressing, with emphasis, that the deadline for seeking the court’s review of the denial of the variance is put on hold “ ‘until the special magistrate’s recommendation is acted upon by the local government.’ ”
Bentley and Gaillard further contend that the county is attempting to use the alleged Saba Sands’ abandonment of the FLUEDRA process — which, they note again, “is unsupported by the record” — “to argue that ‘there is a question as to whether Saba Sands may rely on the statutory tolling provision’ at all. This is nonsense.”
They add, “Nothing in the statute provides for the rule the County is asserting here: that once a FLUEDRA petition is filed, unless the FLUEDRA proceeding is completed and results in government action on a special magistrate’s recommendations, any appeal of the denial the landowner sought to amicably resolve by initiating the FLUEDRA proceeding would necessarily be untimely.
“Such a rule would inevitably lead to confusion and potentially even abuse,” Bentley and Gaillard continue. “If a government entity failed to act on the special magistrate’s recommendations, either due to neglect or bad faith, that would effectively prevent a landowner from challenging its decision indefinitely.”
They then delve into the DeSoto County case to expand their argument that the Saba Sands court filing was timely.
Finally, Bentley and Gaillard ask the court to deny the county’s motion to dismiss the case, “require a response as necessary from the County,” and schedule oral arguments on the matter.”